Das Ich Denke

Upcoming Conferences II

2009-07-17T11:13:00.002+02:00

Thought-Experiments and the Apriori, Conference at the University of Fortaleza, Brazil (Aug 11-14, 2009)

Preliminary Schedule

Tuesday, 8/11/09

9.15-9.30 Opening

9.30-10.50 Albert Casullo: "Intuition, Thought Experiments and the Apriori"

11.00-12.20 Jonathan Ichikawa: "Is imagination a priori?"

14.00-15.20 Joao Branquinho: "On the Revisability of A Priori Truths"

15.30-16.50 Anna-Sara Malmgren: "The Justification of Intuitive Judgments"

17.10-18.30 Hilary Kornblith: "Is There Room for Armchair Theorizing in Epistemology?"

Wednesday 8/12/09

9.30-10.50 Ernest Sosa: "On the Nature and Scope of Rational Intuitions"

11.00-12.20 Anand Vaidya: "Apriori Warrant Enabled"

14.00-15.20 Konrad Utz: "The Indeterminacy of Apriori Concepts"

15.30-16.50 Desiderio Murcho: "Metaphysical Necessity, Contradiction and Apriori"

17.10-18.30 Marco Ruffino: "Indexicality and A Priori Knowledge"

Thursday 8/13/09

9.30-10.50 Thomas Grundmann & Joachim Horvath: "On the Logic and Structure of Thought Experiments"

11.00-12.20 Brendan Balcerak Jackson: "Thought Experiments and Counterfactuals”

14.00-15.20 Magdalena Balcerak Jackson: "Thought Experiments and Model-Based Philosophy"

15.30-16.50 Frank Hofmann: "Intuition and Imagination in Thought Experiments"

17.10-18.30 Christopher Hill: "Thought Experiments, Quine’s Revisablity Thesis, and the Individuation of Concepts"

Friday 8/14/09

9.30-10.50 Paulo Faria: "Kripke on Apriori Knowledge"

11.00-12.20 Guido Imaguire: "On Putnam’s Thought Experiment: How Direct can be a Reference?"

14.00-15.20 Dirk Greimann: "Does Jackson’s Mary Thought Experiment Involve a Confusion of Two Conceptions of Facts?"

15.30-16.50 Jens Kipper: "Is semantic externalism supported by thought experiments?"

17.10-18.30 Oswaldo Chateubriand: "The Indeterminacy of Translation as a Thought Experiment"

Upcoming Conferences I

2009-07-17T11:04:00.002+02:00

Emmy Noether Armchair Lab: Issues in Philosophical Methodology

28-29 July

University of Cologne

The first in our series of Emmy Noether Armchair Labs will be a workshop on issues in philosophical methodology, with featured speakers Tamar Szabó Gendler and Zoltán Gendler Szabó of the Yale University philosophy department. Here is the schedule:

Tuesday, 28 July: Meta-Ontology

13:00-15:00 Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Yale)

The Ontological Attitude

15:30-16:30 Benjamin Schnieder (Humboldt Uni Berlin)

The Logic of ‘Because’

16:45-17:45 Brendan Balcerak Jackson (Köln)

Are Ontological Debates Merely Verbal Disputes?

Wednesday, 29 July: Thought Experiments

10:00-12:00 Tamar Szabó Gendler (Yale)

Philosophical Methodology from an Empirical Point of View

13:30-14:30 Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (Köln)

Thought Experiments and Model-Based Philosophy

14:45-15:45 Christian Nimtz (Erlangen)

Thought Experiments, Counterfactual Thinking, and the Limits of Empiricism

Argue with Horvath and Grundmann!

2008-09-30T23:07:00.004+02:00

Over at the Experimental Philosophy blog you can argue with me about my presentation at the "Armchair in Flames?" workshop (entitled "Experimental Philosophy and Meta-Epistemology"), and with Thomas about his presentation (entitled "Some hope for intuitions. A reply to Weinberg")!

Nadelhoffer on "Armchair in Flames?"

2008-09-30T16:32:00.004+02:00

Here is Thomas Nadelhoffer with some first reflections on the recent workshop "Armchair in Flames? - Experimental Philosophy and Its Critics" at the Universität zu Köln, which I have organized together with Thomas Grundmann.

Philosophy Feeds + Content Sharing = Netvibes Universe!

2008-08-28T16:35:00.010+02:00

Inspired by Mark Eli Kalderon's recent posts about RSS feeds of philosophy journals and the idea of sharing one's electronic bibliographies, I just put 1 and 1 together and had the idea of sharing one's compilations of philosophy feeds online. A nice and convenient way to to this is with the net-based feed reader Netvibes, where you can publish your own feed pages with only two mouse clicks. If you want to see how this works out, then just click on the tabs of my public Netvibes universe.

Workshop on Experimental Philosophy in Cologne

2008-07-07T23:32:00.003+02:00

We, the organizers Thomas Grundmann and Joachim Horvath, are happy to announce the following workshop:

ARMCHAIR IN FLAMES? – EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND ITS CRITICS

University of Cologne (Germany)
September 22-24, 2008

Recent empirical findings from experimental philosophy suggest that philosophical intuitions are much more sensitive to all kinds of background factors than traditional philosophers have thought. This relativity of intuitions seems to present a severe challenge to the standard procedure in philosophy, namely clarifying philosophical phenomena just by relying on intuitions.

Our workshop will focus on the following questions:
• To what extent are intuitions relative in different areas of philosophy?
• What are the determining background factors? (theory, cultural and socio-economic factors, priming effects etc.)?
• Are intuitions relative across the board and under all conditions? Are folk intuitions, conceptual intuitions as well as rational intuitions equally affected? Does relativity even hold for sufficiently reflected intuitions?
• Can we explain away the experimentally observed relativity by reinterpreting the data or criticizing the methodology of experimental philosophy?
• What bearing do these findings have on the status of intuitions as evidence?

There will be participants from both camps: experimental philosophers as well as more traditionally minded philosophers. Here is a list of confirmed speakers and preliminary titles:

Thomas Grundmann (University of Cologne, Germany): "Some hope for intuitions. A reply to Weinberg"
Frank Hofmann (University of Tübingen, Germany): "Intuitions, dispositions, and the apriori"
Joachim Horvath (University of Cologne, Germany): "Experimental Philosophy and Meta-Epistemology"
Jens Kipper (University of Cologne, Germany): "Philosophers and Grammarians"
Kirk Ludwig (University of Florida, USA): "Intuition and Relativity"
Thomas Nadelhoffer (Dickinson College, USA): "The Psychology of Philosophy"
Christian Nimtz (University of Hamburg, Germany): "What Intuitions are not"
Joseph Shieber (Lafayette College, USA): "On the Very Idea of Experimental Philosophy."
Ernest Sosa (Rutgers University, USA): "Intuitions and X-Phi"
Anand Vaidya (San José State University, USA): "On the Central Theoretical Posit of Experimental Philosophy"
Jonathan Weinberg (Indiana University, USA): "Are Philosophers Experts?"

The workshop is sponsored by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), the Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie (GAP) and the Universität zu Köln.

Attendance of the workshop is free, but please check our website for registration and further information:
http://www.armchairinflames.uni-koeln.de/

Fodor über das "harte Problem" des Bewusstseins

2007-06-04T15:18:00.001+02:00

Gewohnt glänzende Unterhaltung bietet Fodor in seiner Rezension "Headaches have themselves" zum neuen Band mit Galen Strawsons Verteidigung des Panpsychismus. Ideal für den kleinen Hunger zwischendurch!

Looking back at the CUNY Graduate Conference

2007-05-09T15:47:00.000+02:00

Below you can see a picture of me, after my talk, with my commentator Tudor Protopopescu on the left.

Presentation at CUNY Graduate Conference

2007-04-23T09:44:00.000+02:00

Next Saturday, April 28, I will be presenting a paper on the modal argument for a priori justification at the Tenth Annual CUNY Graduate Student Philosophy Conference. You can find the schedule and an abstract of all papers here.

Putnam at 80

2007-03-19T16:23:00.000+01:00

Just back from the great PutnamFest at UCD in Dublin! One of the many highlights was a roundtable discussion on externalism with Putnam, Kripke and Burge (and Devitt as chair). Unfortunately, all of the three denied that they are externalists -- or at least they did not like to refer to themselves as "externalists". But the crucial question is: Is it up to them to decide who is an externalist and who isn't? One probably could make a case that they count as experts on the subject and so we, the simple-minded folk, just have to defer....:-)
Here I have some pictures from the event. On the first, you can see Kripke in full action
(from left to right: Devitt, Putnam, Kripke, Burge):

On the second, Putnam and Kripke are arguing about relative identity (probably):

Sommerschule mit Kornblith in Köln

2007-02-27T16:09:00.000+01:00

6.-10. August, Universität zu Köln

mit Hilary Kornblith (UMass Amherst, USA)

"Knowledge and its Place in Nature:
Psychologism - Externalism – Intuitions"

Was ist Wissen und wie gelangen wir in seinen Besitz? Diese und ähnliche Fragen versucht die philosophische Erkenntnistheorie seit alters her vom Schreibtisch aus durch reines Nachdenken zu beantworten. Begriffsanalyse und philosophische Intuitionen sollen dabei entscheidend weiterhelfen. Der neuerdings aufblühende erkenntnistheoretische Naturalismus hält das für eine fatale Sackgasse. Nach seiner Auffassung müssen sich die Philosophen endlich aus ihrer Stube hinaustrauen und die Phänomene selbst untersuchen, anstatt sich allein mit ihrem müden Abglanz in unseren Begriffen und Intuitionen zu beschäftigen. Kein Naturwissenschaftler käme je auf die Idee, unseren Begriff des Aluminiums zu untersuchen, um herauszubekommen, was Aluminium seiner Natur nach ist. Genauso sollten die Erkenntnistheoretiker Wissen rein empirisch untersuchen und dabei auch die Ergebnisse der Psychologie und Biologie berücksichtigen. Naturalisten fordern also nichts weniger als einen radikalen Methodenwandel in der Erkenntnistheorie. Traditionelle Erkenntnistheoretiker empfinden diese Forderung nicht nur als Provokation, sondern halten den naturalistischen Zugang zur Erkenntnistheorie auch für eine grandiose Verfehlung ihres eigentlichen Themas. Viel Sprengstoff also für eine interessante Debatte!

Mit Prof. Kornblith ist einer der weltweit renommiertesten Naturalisten für eine Woche zu Gast an der Universität zu Köln. Eine internationale Gruppe von Studierenden und Lehrenden wird Gelegenheit haben, sich intensiv und kritisch mit ihm und seinen Thesen auseinanderzusetzen. Es sind nicht nur Fachphilosophen, sondern ganz besonders auch Psychologen, Biologen und andere Interessierte herzlich willkommen. Für Nichtphilosophen wird während der Sommerschule eine besondere Betreuung durch fortgeschrittene Philosophiestudenten angeboten. Da die Veranstaltung in der Teilnehmerzahl beschränkt ist, ist eine vorherige Anmeldung obligatorisch.

Am 7. August wird Prof. Kornblith zudem einen öffentlichen Abendvortrag zum Thema "Belief in the Face of Controversy" halten.

Ausgewählte Publikationen:
Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground, MIT Press, 1993
Knowledge and its Place in Nature, OUP, 2002

Leitung der Summer School: Prof. Dr. Thomas Grundmann (Philosophisches Seminar, Universität zu Köln) in Kooperation mit dem Kölner Gymnasial- und Stiftungsfonds.

Allgemeine Fragen zur Summer School an:
summerschoolphilosophy@uni-koeln.de

Conference on the Value of Knowledge

2007-02-27T16:02:00.000+01:00

The Value of Knowledge

August 27-29, 2007
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands
http://www.knowledgebeliefnormativity.org

Conference Theme
After decades of discussion about the proper analysis of knowledge, epistemologists have started working on questions concerning the value of what they so eagerly have analyzed: knowledge. The rubric of “The Value of Knowledge” covers such questions and topics as:

- Why is knowledge supposed to be more valuable than true belief (the 'Meno problem')?
- What sorts of values accrue to knowledge?
- Is there any value to ignorance?
- What, if anything, accounts for forbidden knowledge?

Keynote Speakers
Alvin Goldman (Rutgers University)
Ernest Sosa (Rutgers University)
Jonathan Kvanvig (Baylor University)
Duncan Pritchard (University of Stirling)

Call for Abstracts
Abstracts of at most 300 words are invited on any topic that is relevant to the conference theme. Abstracts should be submitted by e-mail or regular mail to the conference organizers by March 31, 2007. Notification of acceptance/rejection: April 15, 2007.

Background
This is the first event in a series to be organized in the Knowledge, Belief, and Normativity project run by René van Woudenberg (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), Duncan Pritchard (University of Stirling), and Igor Douven (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven). The conference is held directly prior to the Social Epistemology Conference in Stirling, see http://www.philosophy.stir.ac.uk/postgraduate/SocialEpistemologyConference.php. It is funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research.

Registration
When paid before June 1, 2007 the conference fee is 125,- euros (and 90,- euros for PhD students). After June 1, 2007 the fee becomes 175,- euros (125 euros for PhD students). The fee includes coffee/tea, lunches, and dinners. To register, use the registration form on the website or send us your full contact details including e-mail address. Also let us know of any special dietary requirements you may have.

Contact Details
The conference organizers, Jeroen de Ridder and René van Woudenberg, can be reached at the following email address: g.de_ridder@ph.vu.nl

Conference on Concepts in Copenhagen

2007-02-26T00:02:00.000+01:00

Conference: "Concepts - Content and Constitution"

May 11-12 2007, University of Copenhagen (DK)

Speakers:

F. Gregory Ashby: "Separate Systems (and their Neural Substrates) for Conceptual and Non-Conceptual Category Learning"

José Luis Bermúdez: "Concepts in philosophy and cognitive science"

Daniel C. Dennett: "Varieties of content"

Peter Gärdenfors: "The convexity of concepts and the meeting of minds"

Ruth G. Millikan: "The Vital Role of Useless Concepts (and Other People)"

Jesse J. Prinz: "Picture This: Concepts Are Constituted By Percepts"

More info: www.selskabetfp.dk

Conference on the Square of Opposition

2007-02-23T11:11:00.000+01:00

The Square of Opposition - International Congress
Montreux, Switzerland, June 1-3, 2007

This will be the first international congress dedicated entirely to the square of opposition, considered in its various aspects.

There will be talks by the best specialists of the square and this will be also an interdisciplinary event gathering people from various fields : logic, philosophy, mathematics, psychology, linguistics, anthropology, semiotics. Visual and artistic representations of the square will also be presented.

Invited speakers include Pascal Engel, Laurence Horn,
Saul Kripke, Terence Parsons, Pieter Seuren, Jan Wolenski.

The extended deadline for submission of contributed papers is March 1st 2007. Any contribution related to the square is welcome.

For further information, visit the website below:
http://square-of-opposition.org

Are Naturalism and Evolution Incompatible?

2007-02-20T23:44:00.000+01:00

In his new Stanford article "Religion and Science" (section 5), Alvin Plantinga discusses and endorses an argument to the effect that naturalism and evolution are rationally incompatible. Interesting stuff!

Intuitions and Philosophical Methodology

2007-02-15T15:23:00.000+01:00

Two very interesting discussions on intuitions and philosophical methodology, prompted by Jonathan Ichikawa and hosted by The Splintered Mind:

New Paper "In Defense of Metaphysical Analyticity"

2007-02-03T17:18:00.000+01:00

A new paper by Frank Hofmann and me is now online. Here's an abstract:

According to the so-called metaphysical conception of analyticity, analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning (or content) alone and independently of (extralinguistic) facts. Quine and Boghossian have tried to present a conclusive argument against the metaphysical conception of analyticity. In effect, they tried to show that the metaphysical conception inevitably leads into a highly implausible view about the truthmakers of analytic truths. We would like to show that their argument fails, since it relies on an ambiguity of the notion of ‘independence of (extralinguistic) facts’. If one distinguishes between variation independence and existence independence, the unwelcome view about the truthmakers of analytic truths no longer follows. Thus, there is at best a challenge, but no conclusive argument. The door to the metaphysical conception of analyticity is still open.

Fundstücke

2007-02-02T10:04:00.000+01:00

Fodor macht sich über Wittgenstein lustig (was, zugegeben, nicht übermäßig schwer ist).

Schöne Fotos in Schwarzweiß von bekannten und weniger bekannten Philosophen (u.a. Habermas, Kripke, Lewis, Quine).

Alles über Filme mit philosophischem Inhalt.

Nano-Philosophy

2007-01-11T18:49:00.000+01:00

On Leiter Reports, there's a link to a hilarious new piece of philosophical humour. It is about the idea of "nano-philosophy", i.e. the quest for ever smaller philosophical problems. These five really gave me a pause:

Does ‘God’ exist?
Is abortion always obligatory?
Would you rather be Socrates satisfied or a pig dissatisfied?
Can science be naturalized?
Is classical mechanics consistent with Newton’s laws?

Es sei denn, dass?

2007-01-07T11:18:00.000+01:00

Im ersten Band der deutschen Ausgabe von Barwise' und Etchemendys Logik-Lehrbuch Language, Proof, and Logic [dt. Sprache, Beweis und Logik, Joachim Bromand, Thomas Müller und Giovanni Sommaruga (Hg. und Übs.), mentis 2005, Band I] findet sich auf S. 185 (unten) die These, dass die deutsche Wendung "Q, es sei denn dass P" nach folgendem Schema in die Ausagenlogik zu übersetzen sei: "~P --> Q". Damit wäre ein entsprechender deutscher Satz aber logisch äquivalent zu "P v Q", was kontraintuitiv erscheint, weil er dann auch wahr sein könnte, wenn P und Q beide wahr wären. Hierzu ein Beispiel einer intuitiv korrekten Verwendung von "Q, es sei denn dass P":

(B) Sie werden die Prüfung bestehen, es sei denn ihr Notendurchschnitt ist schlechter als 4,0.

Nach dem vorgeschlagenen Übersetzungsschema wäre (B) also auch dann wahr, wenn mein Notendurchschnitt schlechter als 4,0 wäre und ich die Prüfung bestanden hätte. Nun könnte man natürlich einwenden, dass es eben unmöglich sei, die Prüfung zu bestehen, wenn man einen zu schlechten Notendurchschnitt hat. Aber logisch unmöglich kann es nicht sein, da es durchaus eine mögliche Welt gibt, in der die Prüfungsmodalitäten kurzfristig so geändert werden, dass ich die Prüfung auch mit einer 4,1 noch bestehen würde. Falls das Übersetzungsschema "~P --> Q" bzw. "P v Q" richtig wäre, dann wäre (B) in dieser möglichen Situation immer noch wahr. Intuitiv verstehen wir den Satz aber so, dass P auf jeden Fall falsch ist, gegeben dass Q. Mein Gegenvorschlag eines alternativen Überstzungsschemas wäre daher "Q --> ~P" bzw. "~Q v ~P". Denn der ursprüngliche Übersetzungsvorschlag führt, wenn er unseren sprachlichen Intuitionen gerecht werden soll, meines Erachtens in folgendes Dilemma:

(1) Entweder wir benötigen die Zusatzprämisse, dass ~(P & Q) gilt, um den kontraintuitiven Fall auszuschließen, dass (B) auch dann wahr wäre, wenn P und Q beide wahr wären. Man müsste also postulieren, dass in allen intuitiv korrekten Verwendungen von "Q, es sei denn dass P" eine solche Zusatzprämisse mitbehauptet wird, was ad hoc erscheint - bzw., wenn es nicht ad hoc ist, dass es ein besseres Übersetzungsschema gibt, nämlich "~(P & Q) & (P v Q)" (was dem exklusiven Oder entspricht).

(2) Oder "es sei denn dass" ist ein impliziter Modaloperator, der (unter anderem) die Unmöglichkeit von P & Q ausdrückt. In diesem Fall wäre jedoch keine rein aussagenlogische Formalisierung wirklich angemessen.

Wieviel müssen wir spenden, um die globale Armut zu besiegen?

2006-12-24T14:30:00.000+01:00

Ein exzellenter Weihnachtsartikel von Peter Singer zum Thema globale Armut, Mäzenatentum und die Spendenpflichten der Wohlhabenden. Die zu erwartende, aber dennoch unter Rationalitätsgesichtspunkten irritierende Schlussfolgerung: Wenn lediglich alle Amerikaner und Bewohner anderer wohlhabender Länder mit einem Jahreseinkommen von über 90.000 $ in etwa 10% jährlich spenden würden, ließe sich die globale Armut beinahe mühelos besiegen - und zwar ohne nennenswerte Einschränkungen im Leben der Wohlhabenden. Die Frage ist eigentlich nur: Wie lange wollen wir noch warten? Entschuldigung dafür gibt es sicher keine, zumindest nicht für alle diejenigen, die 10 oder 5 oder auch nur 1 Prozent ihres Jahreseinkommens spenden könnten, ohne dass es ihnen im Geringsten weh tun würde (also praktisch wir alle!).

Tugendhat über Heidegger

2006-12-18T16:35:00.000+01:00

Ein annähernd wörtliches Zitat aus Tugendhats heutiger Vorlesung zu "Sein und Zeit" (hier in Tübingen): "Während §16 immerhin eine gute Idee enthält, finde ich §17 hingegen unter aller Sau."

Ramsey + Moore = God ?

2006-12-17T10:53:00.000+01:00

There's a very nice one-page paper by David Chalmers and Alan Hájek with the promising title "Ramsey + Moore = God". It tries to prove, by assuming the Ramsey test and the irrationality of Moore-paradoxical beliefs, that any rational being ought to believe that it believes everything that is the case and that everything that it believes is true (there's also a little discussion about the paper on fragments of consciousness).

Williamsons neues Buch online

2006-12-15T11:06:00.000+01:00

Als Begleitlektüre zu den Hempel-Vorlesungen in Princeton gibt es Williamsons neues Buch über Metaphilosophie gleich gratis dazu. Titel: "The Philosophy of Philosophy"

The Times They Are A-Changin'

2006-12-09T22:41:00.000+01:00

The beginning of William James' THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE (from 1902) nicely illustrates how Europe has spoiled its academic supremacy in just a few decades...

"IT is with no small amount of trepidation that I take my place behind this desk, and face this learned audience. To us Americans, the experience of receiving instruction from the living voice, as well as from the books, of European scholars, is very familiar. At my own University of Harvard, not a winter passes without its harvest, large or small, of lectures from Scottish, English, French, or German representatives of the science or literature of their respective countries whom we have either induced to cross the ocean to address us, or captured on the wing as they were visiting our land. It seems the natural thing for us to listen whilst the Europeans talk. The contrary habit, of talking whilst the Europeans listen, we have not yet acquired; and in him who first makes the adventure it begets a certain sense of apology being due for so presumptuous an act."

Analytischer Pessimismus

2006-12-04T10:11:00.000+01:00

Better Never to Have Been
The Harm of Coming into Existence

David Benatar

Description

* Is it good to be alive?
* A radical challenge to bioethics.
* Clearly argued, accessible to non-specialists.
* This may be the most provocative philosophical view ever defended.

Most people believe that they were either benefited or at least not harmed by being brought into existence. Thus, if they ever do reflect on whether they should bring others into existence---rather than having children without even thinking about whether they should---they presume that they do them no harm. Better Never to Have Been challenges these assumptions. David Benatar argues that coming into existence is always a serious harm. Although the good things in one's life make one's life go better than it otherwise would have gone, one could not have been deprived by their absence if one had not existed. Those who never exist cannot be deprived. However, by coming into existence one does suffer quite serious harms that could not have befallen one had one not come into existence. Drawing on the relevant psychological literature, the author shows that there are a number of well-documented features of human psychology that explain why people systematically overestimate the quality of their lives and why they are thus resistant to the suggestion that they were seriously harmed by being brought into existence. The author then argues for the 'anti-natal' view---that it is always wrong to have children---and he shows that combining the anti-natal view with common pro-choice views about foetal moral status yield a 'pro-death' view about abortion (at the earlier stages of gestation). Anti-natalism also implies that it would be better if humanity became extinct. Although counter-intuitive for many, that implication is defended, not least by showing that it solves many conundrums of moral theory about population.

Readership: Philosophers, especially moral philosopher; bioethicists

Contents
1. Introduction
2. Why coming into existence is always a harm
3. How bad is coming into existence?
4. Having Children: The Anti-Natal View
5. Abortion: The 'Pro-Death' View
6. Population and Extinction
7. Conclusion

Author
David Benatar, University of Cape Town

Dazu passt der folgende "kontinentale" Klassiker:

Vom Nachteil, geboren zu sein.
von Emile M. Cioran

Verlag: Suhrkamp; Auflage: 13., Aufl. (Januar 1979)
ISBN: 3518370499

Auszug:
Drei Uhr morgens. Ich nehme diese Sekunde wahr, dann jene, ich ziehe die Bilanz jeder Minute. Wozu das alles! - Weil ich geboren wurde. Aus durchwachten Nächten besonderer Art erwächst die Infragestellung der Geburt.

"Seitdem ich auf der Welt bin", - dieses seitdem scheint mir voll von einem so erschreckenden Sinn, daß er unerträglich wird.

Es gibt ein Erkennen, das dem, was man tut, Gewicht und Tragweite nimmt: für dieses Erkennen ist alles bodenlos mit Ausnahme seiner selbst: rein bis zur Verabscheuung der Idee des Objekts drückt es dieses äußerste Wissen aus, nach welchem es einerlei ist, ob man eine Tat ausführt oder nicht; zu ihm gehört eine ebenfalls höchste Befriedigung: nämlich, bei jeder Gelegenheit wiederholen zu können, daß keine Geste, die man ausführt, wert ist, daß man ganz zu ihr steht; daß nichts durch irgendeine Spur von Substanz überhöht wird; daß die »Wirklichkeit« dein Bereich des Sinnwidrigen angehört. Eine solche Kenntnis verdiente es, posthum genannt zu werden: sie formt sich, als sei der Kennende lebendig und nicht lebendig, Sein und erinnertes Sein. Das ist schon Vergangenheit", sagt er von allem, was er ausführt, und zwar schon im Augenblick der Tat, die folglich für alle Zeit der Gegenwart beraubt ist.

Wir rennen nicht dem Tod entgegen, wir fliehen vor der Katastrophe der Geburt, wir zappeln uns ab - Gerettete, die vergessen möchten. Die Angst vor dem Tod ist nichts als die Projektion einer Angst, die mit unserem ersten Augenblick anhebt, in die Zukunft.

Sie fragen, Dr. Peter Singer antwortet

2006-11-25T11:29:00.000+01:00

From the Belfast Telegraph

What do you think of the people who are trying to shut down Huntington Life Sciences laboratories?
Don Royal, Kent

I’d like to see HLS shut down, because there has been appalling animal suffering there. But the problem isn’t just HLS, it’s the attitude we have to animals. Factory farming is a much bigger problem - the number of animals suffering there is vastly greater, and everyone who buys factory farm products is responsible for the continuation of that cruelty. So to change that we need to persuade the general public to change their attitude to animals. On that, the tactics used against HLS don’t help. They make the animal movement seem like fanatics, or even worse, terrorists. Our case for animals rests on ethical foundations. When we descend to abuse and harassment, people lose sight of that.

Where should one draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate direct action?
Alastair Banton, London

I support civil disobedience, in the tradition of Gandhi and Martin Luther King. I also support animal activists who trespass to document animal abuse and rescue animals who are suffering or dying. I do not support the use of violence or intimidation.

Isn’t it contradictory to ascribe human-based rights to animals? Surely it is absurd to apply a purely human concept to an animal who has no hope of ever understanding such a thing?
Zaki Nahaboo, London

Not at all. Anyone who ascribes rights to babies or humans with intellectual disabilities must be willing to attribute rights to beings who can’t understand the concept. It’s the moral agents, the ones who are acting, who need to understand the concept. Those to whom we attribute rights, do not need to understand these concepts.

Why should we assign rights to animals when we already recognise duties (of care, preservation of their species, etc) towards them? If animals have a right to life, for example, must we protect them against natural predators in the wild?
Franco Fubin, Cambridge

Unfortunately, we don’t come anywhere near fulfilling the duties we have to animals. If we did, we wouldn’t be bringing misery to the lives of millions of factory farmed animals, for no reason except that we prefer the taste of their flesh to other, cruelty-free and sustainable ways of feeding ourselves. As for protecting prey from predators, if we did that we would be upsetting the ecological system, and the prey would soon become too numerous and starve.

Should we force dogs and lions to stop eating meat?
Michael Gaylard, Bangkok, Thailand

Dogs who live with us, we don’t need to feed meat, and they can do fine without it. Lions, no - I’ve already answered this.

You have argued we should not eat other animals but you draw a line at the oyster. How do you know oysters aren’t sentient?
Nic Riley, London

They don’t have a brain orcentral nervous system, so it is hard to imagine that they can feel pain. But if you have doubts about it, don’t eat them.

Do you have any pets?
Matthew Brown, New York

No.

Would turning to a vegan/vegetarian diet be a first step towards restoring our moral well-being?
Nitin Mehtan, Croydon

I’m more interested in the consequences of that change than in our moral well-being. Going veggie is a very important step, both for what it does for the animals, and what it does to reduce pressure on the environment. It has also been shown to be the single most effective thing that the average person can do to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

I would like to be a vegetarian but I hate nuts, tofu and vegetables. Any tips?
Carl Reid, Edgware

Tofu and nuts are good sources of protein, but assuming you’re an adult - and from your name, I’d guess you are not pregnant or breast-feeding - you don’t need to worry too much about protein. You’ll get enough if you eat bread, rice, potatoes and pasta. Eat lots of fruit for fibre and vitamins. For the same reason, go for wholemeal bread and pasta where you can, and brown rice.

If you were starving and meat was the only sustenance available, would you eat it?
Lily Wilson, Wexford, Ireland

Yes. Everything depends on the consequences. Eating meat because you like the way it tastes is totally different from eating it to survive.

What’s the most effective retort I can use when criticised for being a vegetarian?
David Bradford, Surrey

Try asking them why they are not vegetarian.

You have said that if you had to decide between shooting 10 healthy cows and one healthy human you would have a difficult choice, Why?
Flora Hamilton, Edinburgh

I never said that. On the contrary, I’ve written that it is much worse to kill a being who is aware of having a past and a future, and who plans for the future. Normal humans have such plans, but I don’t think cows do. And normal humans have family and friends who will grieve their death in ways more vivid and longer-lasting than the way cows may care about other cows. (Although a cow certainly misses her calf for a long time, if the calf is taken from her. That’s why there is a major ethical problem with dairy products.) If I really had to make such a decision, I’d kill the cows.

In many parts of the world dogs roam free and are sterilised by animal welfare groups. Would it be less cruel to euthanise them? And are dogs confined in homes - often alone all day - any better off than dogs taking their chances on the streets?
Cindy Milburn

Dogs are pack animals, and shouldn’t be left alone all day. I’m not opposed to euthanasia in some circumstances, but if the dogs are doing all right on their own, it’s better to sterilise them and set them free again.

Are zoos immoral?
Janise Schuler, Greenwich

Most of them are, because they confine animals for our amusement in ways that are contrary to the interests of the animals. But if zoos really put the interests of the animals first, and only then find ways for us to observe them, they are not immoral.

Did caring for your mother as she developed Alzheimer’s change your views about the propriety of terminating the lives of young children with severe mental retardation?
Leila Morrison, Bath

No.

Would you kill a disabled baby?
Karen Meade, Dublin

Yes, if that was in the best interests of the baby and of the family as a whole. Many people find this shocking, yet they support a woman’s right to have an abortion. One point on which I agree with opponents of abortion is that, from the point of view of ethics rather than the law, there is no sharp distinction between the foetus and the newborn baby.

How does it feel to be compared to a Nazi given your grandparents died in the Holocaust?
Ella Ljunggren, London

It’s offensive and frustrating. It’s sad that people have so little understanding of either my views, or what the Nazis really believed.

Do you advise people to give a fifth of their income to charity?
Debra Freeman, Perth

I give more than a fifth, nowadays, but I usually suggest that people give 10 per cent. Of course, it all depends on people’s circumstances, but when there are so many people dying from poverty-related causes giving a tenth of our income to organisations such as Oxfam or Unicef seems a for moral decency.

I am in debt (to financial institutions). Should I prolong my debt repayments by contributing towards alleviating poverty, or should I make my repayments and then give to charity?
Mark Morgan, Bath

Maybe you should cut your spending?

Does free will exist and if so, is it restricted to human beings, or can other animals have it?
E Castlee, Brighton

In a deep metaphysical sense, I don’t think free will exists. But we, and some animals, can make choices, and that’s real enough, whatever the causes of our choices.

What is the most immoral thing you have ever done?
Jamie Baxter, Liverpool

Spending too much money on myself when others need it a lot more.

Is it impossible for the human race to reach its potential?
Peter Braham, West Yorkshire

Whatever it’s potential, it’s possible. But don’t ask me if it will actually happen.

Would you say your fundamental ethical principle is that we should attempt to do least harm; and if so, the main problem this raises is knowing how to compare different kinds of harm?
Stephen Morley

No, I think we should try to reduce harm as much as possible, which is different from ourselves doing the least harm. It isn’t easy to compare different types of harm, but we have to do our best.

Are there moral absolutes, if so, what are they and why?
Renae Mann

The only moral absolute is that we should do what will have the best consequences for all those affected by our actions.

Your philosophy seems very heavy. What do you do to chill out?
V J Singh, London

Go hiking and get away from the crowds.

Is your species a plague on the planet?
David Underhill, Alabama

We’ve certainly done a lot of damage to other species, but “plague” isn’t the right term.

How do we deal with people like George Bush, who care nothing for truth or logic in their bid to get their own way?
Julia Iskandar, London

Try to get others to see them this way, so that they’ll be voted out of office.

Thanks largely to your work, utilitarianism is now best known as ” the baby-killing philosophy”. Are you really maximising good consequences with this focus on infanticide?
Richard Penny, Helsinki

I haven’t focused on infanticide. It’s always been a minor aspect of my work. The focus is that of my opponents, and the media.

Animal rights activists are often seen as dirty. How often do you wash?
J Mann, by email

Once a month, whether I need it or not.

You once included Pride and Prejudice in a list of your top ten books. Was Jane Austen a feminist?
Carrie Howard, Manchester

Of course! Do you think Elizabeth Bennet meekly did whatever men told her to do?

Why should I be moral?
Katie Farrell, New York

Well … I’ve written a whole book on that topic How Are We to Live?, but in a single sentence: you’ll find it more fulfilling, in the long run, to contribute to making the world a better place, than to think just of your own interests.

Do you ever live up to your surname and sing?
Wilson Evans by email

Yes, but if my ancestors were really singers, I’d like to know what happened to the staying-in-tune genes.

8. Kongress der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie

2006-11-24T01:15:00.000+01:00

Österreichische Gesellschaft für Philosophie
8. Kongress
Gehirne und Personen
Mit einem Schwerpunkt zur Österreichischen Philosophie
7. bis 9. Juni 2007 in Graz

Hauptvortragende:
Ansgar Beckermann (D)
Marcia Cavell (USA)
Sabine A. Döring (GB/D)
Eberhard Schockenhoff (D)
Lutz Wingert (D)
Karl Acham (A)

Call for Papers:
Neben vier Schwerpunktsektionen sind neun weitere Sektionen eingerichtet, die für Vorträge zu allen anderen Themen der Philosophie offen stehen. Die Vorträge in sämtlichen Sektionen sollen nicht länger als 40 Minuten dauern, wobei für die Diskussion mehr als 10 Minuten vorzusehen sind. Für jeden Beitrag muss bis spätestens 28. Februar 2007 ein Abstract im Umfang von maximal 40 Zeilen abgegeben werden.

Schwerpunktsektionen:
(1) Gehirne und Personen I: Theoretische Philosophie
(2) Gehirne und Personen II: Praktische Philosophie - Ethik
(3) Gehirne und Personen III: Praktische Philosophie - Sozialphilosophie
(4) Österreichische Philosophie

Allgemeine Sektionen:
(1) Erkenntnistheorie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Logik und Sprachphilosophie
(2) Philosophie des Geistes
(3) Metaphysik und Ontologie
(4) Religionsphilosophie
(5) Anthropologie
(6) Ästhetik und Kulturphilosophie
(7) Phänomenologie und Hermeneutik
(8) Ethik
(9) Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie

Die Anmeldung mit Vortrag ist bis 28.2.2007 möglich. Die Anmeldung ohne Vortrag ist bis 31.5.2007 möglich. Die Anmeldung wird mit der Einzahlung der Kongressgebühr gültig.

Anmeldeformular und weitere Informationen auf: www.oegp.org./kongress07

Organisation:
Frau Friederike Perry
Tel.: ++43 (0)316 380-2299
E-Mail: oegpkongress07@uni-graz.at

Ao. Univ.-Prof. Dr. Christian Hiebaum
Universität Graz
Institut für Rechtsphilosophie, Rechtssoziologie und Rechtsinformatik
Universitätsstraße 15, A-8010 Graz
Tel.: ++43 (0)316 380-3394
E-Mail: christian.hiebaum@uni-graz.at
Fax: ++43 (0)316 380-693394

Putnams 80. Geburtstag mit Kripke, Burge, McDowell u.a.

2006-11-22T11:28:00.000+01:00

UCD School of Philosophy
Dublin Ireland
Conference in Honour of Hilary Putnam’s 80th Birthday
March 11-14 2007

Speakers

David Albert (Columbia)
Ned Block (NYU)
Richard Boyd (Cornell)
Tyler Burge (UCLA)
Stanley Cavell (Harvard)
James Conant (Pittsburgh)
Michael Devitt (CUNY)
Hartry Field (NYU)
Juliet Floyd (Boston University)
Paul Franks (University of Toronto)
Warren Goldfarb (Harvard)
Russell Goodman (University of New Mexico)
Christopher Hookway (Sheffield)
Saul Kripke (CUNY)
David Macarthur (University of Sydney)
John McDowell (Pittsburgh)
Yemima Ben-Menahem (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Axel Mueller (Northwestern)
Alva Noë (Berkeley)
Charles Parsons (Harvard)
Hilary Putnam (Harvard)
Ruth Anna Putnam (Wellesley College)
Charles Travis (King’s College London)
Crispin Wright (St. Andrews)

Chairpersons and Commentators

Paul Benacerraf (Princeton)
Alan Berger (Brandeis University)|
Anat Biletzki (Tel Aviv University)
Peter Clarke (St Andrews)
L. Alberto Cordero-Lecca (CUNY)
Yuval Dolev (BUI)
Norma B. Goethe (University of Cordoba, Argentina)
Steven Gross (John Hopkins University)
John Haldane (St. Andrews)
Bob Hale (Sheffield)
Arata Hamawaki (University of Chicago)
Pierre Jacob (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris)
Hilla Jacobson (BUI)
Ofra Rechter (Tel Aviv University)
Mark Wilson (Pittsburgh)

Registration forms, full programme and further information are available
from

http://www.putnamucd.com/

Places may be limited, so early booking is advised.

Amerikanische Graduiertenkonferenzen

2006-11-16T14:11:00.000+01:00

Rutgers-Princeton Graduate Conference 2007,
10.-11. März 2007 (Deadline: 12. Januar)
philconf@gmail.com

City University of New York, Tenth Annual Graduate
Student Philosophy Conference, April 28, 2007
(Deadline: 15. Januar):
philgradconference@gc.cuny.edu

University of Texas at Austin Graduate Philosophy
Conference, April 27-28, 2007
(Deadline: 2. Februar):
https://webspace.utexas.edu/jtb538/2007.htm

Konferenz der Spanischen Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie (SEFA)

2006-11-16T14:07:00.000+01:00

Fifth Conference of the Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy (SEFA-5)
University of Barcelona, 7-9 September 2007
Call for Papers (Deadline for submissions, April 2, 2007)

Main speakers:
Cristina Lafont, Northwestern University
Wolfgang Künne, University of Hamburg
Kendall Walton, University of Michigan

The fifth meeting of the Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy (SEFA-5) will be held on 7-9 September 2007 at the Faculties of Philosophy and Geography and History of the University of Barcelona. The society welcomes submissions on any philosophical topic, for 30 minutes talks followed by a 10 minutes discussion in either of the official languages of the conference, Spanish and English.

Submissions should consist of a detailed summary of the intended talk (about 1000 words). Summaries are expected to indicate the topic, present the main thrust of the talk, and provide a sketch of the main arguments. Please specify at the beginning of the summary the exact title of the talk, your name and your address and e-mail. Decisions on acceptance will be based on this summary.

Please make sure that the document is in WORD- or rtf-format (either PC or MAC) formatted as follows: page settings DIN A4, all margins 3 cm, font TIMES NEW ROMAN 12 pt, single line spacing, title of the talk in bold, justified and centered. Please print name and address in standard (non-bold). Main text also justified.

Deadline for submissions: April 2nd, 2007.

Selection: All abstracts will be blind-refereed. Efforts will be made to include in the program quality original papers from different philosophical disciplines. Notification of acceptance will be sent by April 30th, 2006.

Programme committee: Daniel Quesada (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), José Díez, Manuel García-Carpintero, Josep Macià, Genoveva Martí, José Martínez, Manuel Pérez Otero, Sven Rosenkranz (Universitat de Barcelona), Max Kölbel (University of Birmingham), Luis Fernández (Universidad Complutense de Madrid), Joan Pagès, David Pineda, Josep Ll. Prades (Universitat de Girona), Juan Acero, Esther Romero (Universidad de Granada), Manuel Hernández (Universidad de Murcia), Dan López de Sa (New York University), Luis Valdés (Universidad de Oviedo), Fabrice Correia (Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Tarragona), Jesús Ezquerro (Universidad del País Vasco), Tobies Grimaltos (Universidad de Valencia).

Organizing committee: José Díez, Manuel García-Carpintero, Manuel Pérez Otero. Cristina Roadevin, Luis Robledo (Universitat de Barcelona), Daniel Quesada (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), David Pineda (Universitat de Girona), Lorenzo Baravalle (Universitat Rovira i Virgili).

Information about registration, accommodation, etc., will be available soon on the website of the meeting: http://www.ub.es/grc_logos/sefa_5

Sponsors: Dirección General de Investigación; Direcció General de Recerca; SEFA; Universitat de Barcelona.

Venue:
Facultats de Geografia i Història i Filosofia
Universitat de Barcelona
Montalegre, 6-8, 4ª planta, porta 4044
08001 Barcelona
Further information:
Manuel García-Carpintero, logos@pcb.ub.es

Die Highlights der letzten Wochen

2006-11-11T11:41:00.000+01:00

Kripke-Vorlesung und Diskussion an der CUNY (25. Januar 2006):
http://web.gc.cuny.edu/Philosophy/kripke/kripke_lecture.wmv
http://web.gc.cuny.edu/Philosophy/kripke/kripke_discussion.wmv

Weitere Philosophie-Videos:
http://www.lecturesarchive.com/5819.html
http://ethics.sandiego.edu/video/Catalogue/all.asp
http://www.reitstoen.com/multimedia.php

Philosophie-Dissertationen Online:
https://webspace.utexas.edu/deverj/personal/test/dissertations.html

Chalmers "entdeckt" satirisches Dretske-Paper "wieder":
http://fragments.consc.net/djc/2006/10/ziring_ziderata.html

Test

2006-07-27T15:52:00.000+02:00

Das Ich denke muss alle meine Postings begleiten können...

Start

2006-07-26T00:04:00.000+02:00

Ich bin jetzt hier!